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BRIEF OF RFSPOODENrS 
Case No, 16175 
This is an action in tort for perscnal injuries alleged to have been 
caused the Plaintiff-~pellant, Jess Kilpack, in a farm accident en J\0! 21, 
1976, in Payson, Utah. Plaintiff-Appellant claims that Defendants-Respondents 
neelieently caused the injuries ~lained of in the ~laint. 
DISPOSITION rn TIIE LOWER CDURT 
The case was tried to a jury in the Fourth Judicial District Court m 
October 2, 3, and 4, 1978. The issues were submitted to the jury on a Special 
Verdict fonn and the jury found that the Defendants-Respondents were not negligent 
and detennined Plaintiff-Appellants special damages at $5,594.63, but indicated by 
a dash ("---") that there were no general damages. Pursuant to the answers to the 
Special Verdict form, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants-Respcndents 
and against Plainti:f-Appellants, no cause of action. The Court subsequently denied 
Plaintiff's l\btion Vor a !leH Trial or in the Alternative For a Judtz}rent Notwithstand-
int: the Verdict. 
mCLU:F SOlKrliT OI-l APPEAL 
DefG1d2nts-Respondents seek to have the judgment of the trial court 
.• 
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STAm£Nl' OF FACIS 
tn Jule 21, 1976, at about 3:00 p.m., Jess Kilpack was injured in a farm 
accident at his tbcle Mark WifP<lll's farm in Payscn, Utah. Visiting at the Wignall 
fam an the day of the accident were two sisters, Edna Kilpack and 6 of her 10 
children and Rhea Wil.soo and her 4 children. The Wignalls had 6 children. After 
the three sisters, Mrs. Kilpack, Mrs. Wilscn and Mrs. Wi.gpall had gone shopping, 
t.a1c1nr. 8CIIe of the younger children with them, of those that remained, 5 childrEn, 
Damy Wileen, age 9, Joel Kilpack, age 9, Jess Kilpack, age 7, Dennis Wilson, age 
6 md Debbie Wilscn, age 5, asked Uncle Mark Wignall if they could go to the hay 
field with him. Uncle Mark Wignall consented. The 5 children got into the bed 
of the truck and were driven 1-2 miles to the hay field, where a ferris wheel 
loader was hooked onto the truck. Uncle Hark Wignall told the children that "they 
would either have to get in the cab or clear out EMay from the truck into the 
field." (Tr. 77) . 
"0. After the truck arrived at the field ~1at, 
if any instructions or directions did you give 
to the children regarding what they should do or 
\~here they should ride? 
A. When we stopped the truck in the field and 
the Ferris ~eel was being hooked up, I told 
them that they could not ride in the back, since 
hay would be ccxning in there and that they would 
either have to get in the cab or clear out EMay 
fran the truck into the field." (Tr. p. 77:16-24). 
The 2 older boys went out into the field and the 3 other children got into the 
cab. 
David \olignall, aee 20. drove the truck and traveled d0\-1!1 the field at 
about 5 m.p.h. (Tr. 61 and 81). 
"0. Hew fast in terms of miles per hour was 
the truck travelinp:. other than the times it 
stopped for bale jamurs as it proceeded dohn 
the field back and forth? 
A. Five miles an hotK." (Tr. p. 61:23-26) 
As the ferris wheel loader picked un the hales of hay about every 5-10 sccot1Js 
(Tr. 86), Mark Hir,nall tock them off and olaced tnEn in tne hed of the trock. 
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About 5 minutes into the haying baling operatial, the 3 ddldn!n in the cab clf..., 
out the window on the passenger side and down cnto the nnrlng board. David told 
the children to "get back in the cab." (Tr. 60) 
"Q. Did there CCDE a tine when the smaller 
children departed out the cab cliDbing through 
the window? 
A. Yes." (Tr. p. 59:29-30, p. 60:1) 
***** 
"Q. And did you say sarething to than about 
getting bc:ck in? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. \.Jhat did you say? 
A. I told them to get back in the cab. 
Q. And that was at what point? After they 
were out or --
A. After they was out." (Tr. 60:10-17) 
The two younger children, Dennis Wilson, age 6, and Debbie Wilscn, age 5, obeyed 
and got back in the cab. (Tr. 60) . Jel'ls Kilpack did not obey and stayed en the 
rurming board. (Tr. 60). 
"Q. ·And did any of them get back in the cab? 
A. Yes, two of them got back in, the two Wilson 
kids, and Jess stayed back out, stayed out on 
the runnin~ board." (Tr. p. 60:18-21) 
\;'hile David Wignall did not enforce his request, it was apparently stern enough to 
have an effect on the two younger children, although not Jess Kilpack. 
"Q. Did you say anything else to those t.lu'ee 
little kids, other than just 'get back in'? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you make any effort to really enforce 
it? 
A. No." (Tr. p. 61:18-22). 
David \~ignall could only see Jess Kilpack' s head and thus, he did not know what he 
11as dcing on the nmning board. 
"Q. Could you see Jess Kilnack riding on the 
running board, hang in~ on out there prior to 
the tiiTe he jurrped? 
A. Yes. 
Q. H01-1 llliCh of his bcxly was visible throur,h 
the passenf'er windCJ\v? 
A. Oh, ;ust his head." (Tr. o. 63:12-18) 
Je:ss Yil?J.Ck rer;Bined on the running board for about 15 minutes and then apnarently 
jl£:)ed off or. to a bale of hay, slipned and fell back under the right rear dual 
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'tlheela of the truck, which rm over him. 
"Q. 'How lcng was it after they went out 
the window, fran that point to the time of the 
accident? You had been out in the field twenty 
minues?' 
'Probably about fifteen minutes or so.'" 
err. p. 63:26-29> 
David Wignall observed the two older boys out in the field fNa:y fran 
the truck straightening bales of ha:y and "on an occasion or two" (Tr. 58), they 
returned to the truck and jUiped off the running board and went back out in the 
field to straighten bales of hay again. err. 58). 
"Q. Ckay. t-hat happened after you started 
dawn thr~ the field relative to the activity 
of Joel and Jess? Did you observe thE!ll cane 
back to the truck on an occasion or two? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Clinb up on the ruming board? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Ride for a period of time, then junp off 
again? 
A. Yes." (Tr. p. 58:12-20) 
***** 
"Q. Okay. You observed then straightening 
hay bales, then returning to the truck, jump-
i.ng up on the running board ridinr; and off again 
and runni.ng and straightening hay bales ap,ain. 
A. Yes." (Tr. p. 58:27-30, p. 59:1) 
Mark Wignall observed the two older boys out in the field <ruay fran the 
truck, but "didn't observe anything" with reEard to their caning back to the truD< 
(Tr. 79). 
"Q. Prior to the accident, \·chat did you notice 
respecting the activities of the tHo nine year 
old boys, since you indicated they had gone out 
ahead of the trud' to straip,hten up hay bales? 
A. I noticed the ~·o older boys out ~vay frOQ 
the truck sane distance into the field." (Tr. 
p. 78:30, p. 79:1-5) 
~·~ ·'· ·'- -·~ _,_ 
" " " " " 
"0. i.Jhat did vou o:,serve regrtrdin;o the activi-
ties thereafter relati,·e to cclnino haci~ to the 
truck? · 
A. I didn't observl' <L'lvthir"lt;." Uc-. p. 79:8-lO) 
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Mark Wignall did not; see the children clillb out of the wi.ndCJw, but he did notice 
at scme point that scme children, he doesn't recall1ibich mea, were an the run-
ning board. 
"Q. Did you observe anything with respect to 
the activities of the children in the --who 
were initially in the cab as you were 1~ 
hay onto the back prior to the time the acci-
dent occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. "What did you notice? trl'lat did you observe? 
A. I noticed they were m the ruming board. 
Q. Do you recall whim ones you noticed out 
there on the rurmi.ng board? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you renenber them -- do you rE!III!IIber 
seeing them actually in cli..ni>ing activity 
out of the window onto the running board? 
A. No, sir." (Tr. p. 79:13-26) 
Because of the heigth of the siding on the trucl~. it was "difficult for him to 
see what was going on on the running board." (Tr. 85). "Relative to the time of 
the accident happeni.nr,, he did not observe anything at all before the time Jess 
got nm over." (Tr. 85). 
"Q. At line 15, the question was asked: 'Do 
you recall, though, that your vision becare 
obstructed as to what the kids were or were 
doing before the accident. ' Can you read your 
answer? 
Answer: 'Yes, it was necessary tor me to go 
back. The Ferris Wheel delivers the bale in 
approximately the middle of the truck and it was 
necessary for me to take the bale fran there 
and place it. In placing them at the frmt, I 
would be going up and back and it would make it 
difficult for me to see because of the height 
of the bed. Difficult for me to see what was 
going on on the rurming board.' 
Question: 'Relative to the time of the accident 
hapnening did you observe anything at all before 
the time Jess pot run over?' 
Could you read your an~ver? 
An~ver: 'No."' (Tr. p. 85:13-29) 
There ,,•as no screilffiing or yellinr by the children prior to the accident. 
"Q. Did you hear anything relative to children 
scremnr, or yellinr prior to the time Jess was 
run over? 
A. tJo " (Tr. p 81.17-20) 
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'lbe truck had been in the field about 20 minutes prior to the accident . 
"Q. How loog had the truck been in the field 
gathering bales before the accident? 
A. I don't know. I would guess probably 
twenty minutes. 
Q. Had the truck -- at what speed, average 
speed, was t!le truck traveling in gathering 
bales en that occasicn? 
A. Average wrul.d probably be fran five to 
eight miles an hour, I would guess." (Tr. 
P. 31-9-16) 
Maxk Wignall and David Wir~Ulll had been on 2-3 prior trips to the hay 
field that day before the accident. They were not in any particular hurry to get 
the work done. (Tr. 87). Danny tnlson, age 9, had been out on prior trips and 
David Wignall thought Joel Kilpack, age 9, had been out on a prior trip. (Tr. 
66). The children had not gone out to assist the Wi~ls in any way. 
"Q. Were the children going out to the hay 
field to assist you in any way? 
A. No." (Tr. p. 85:5-7) 
Jess Kilpack testified that his parents had told him "it was danr,erous 
to be around IID~ cars and IIDving trucks." (Tr. 40) As soon as they got 
to the hay field, David and Mark told Jess to "get into the cab" (Tr. 46) and 
to ''be careful." (Tr. 45-46). Jess had been on a rrerry-go-round before and knew 
it would be dangerous to jurp off before it stopped. (Tr. 42). He junped off 
the running board so he could go play with Joel and Danny, but he didn't know 
why he jumped onto the bale of hay instead of onto the ground. (Tr. 42). The 
truck would stop from time to time when a bale of hay would p,et stuck in the loac'e: 
(Tr. 69). No one saw him junr and he doesn't knm• if anyone \,·as Cl\vare that he 1>2' 
poinp, to jl.lllp. (Tr. 43-44). After he junped onto the bale of hav, he fell bac~· 
wards towards the truck. (Tr. 36). Tne bales of hay in hei(i1t Here atout eve.'l 
1-Jith the height of the nllll1i!1f board, \·:ere an;,,~1crc fron ap.Jinst t'lc runni.n;· r,,·:.: 
to 3-4 feet :nvav, and \,·ere dry and ~>'ere- not s linperv. (Tr. 6°- ;·o) . 
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Ellna Kilpack, Jess' uother, testified that they had visited the W1Fall 
farm with their children oo. three prior occasions, and she and her b.lsband had 
participated in a ''hay gathering operaticn." She acknowledged that "a faraa per 
se has many places on it where children could get in tro\.Ole", but dl.dn't recall 
giving any instructions to Joel and Jess on this occasioo.. She kne.w 'Madt a 
his boys had been involved in the hay gathering operatioo. earlier in the day." 
\·Jhen she and her two sisters left to go on an errand, she left Joel and Jeaa 
"in the care of DeLynn" , her 14-year-old daughter, who was there visi~ the 
16-year-old Wignall girl. (See Exhibit B included herein), 
In regard to Jess Kilpack' s injuries, his uother, Ellna Kil.pack, testi-
fied as follows : 
"Q. Cc>ul.d I get you to tmn to page 14 of your 
deposition, particularly line 21. This was a 
question asked on January 8, 1977, by me. 
Questicn: 'As far as getting along now with 
the normal affairs of life, physically speaking, 
how is he doing? ' 
What was your answer? 
ltrlswer: 'He does fine. He looks a little 
crooked, but he is really doing fine.' 
Question: 'Looks crooked? In what way does 
he look crooked?' 
Read your answer. 
ftnswer: 'His body looks a little crooked. It 
looks like one leg is -- he is a little twisted 
right in the buttocks area.' 
Question: 'Physically, what else have you 
noticed about hir.1 in terms of what he can or 
can' t do now? ' 
Answer: 'He can do pretty near everythinp:. ' 
Question: 'He rrentions he doesn't nm as fast. 
Do you have a comment in that repard?' 
Ans\ver: 'Hell, he doesn't, but he does nm. 
I am grateful that he even nms. He is !IDre of a 
nervous type child than he ever \vas before. Any 
little thing -- he just screams in a high pitched 
tone and all the other kids corroplain that he is 
spoiled. He doesn't have any patience for taking 
anything.' 
Question: ·~1at differences have you noticed 
~out Jess after the accident that are different 
than Hhat h0 \,'as like before the accident?' 
Ans\,·er: '1hat's all, iust those.' 
Q. 1hat \.Jas your testi.rmny on that occasion? 
A. Uh-hul-J. 
Q. \·Jas it true? 
A. Yes, but I still think ~o:e need to \vatch him and he 
still continues to have nrohlt.."TlS." (See Exhibit B included 
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Point I 
REAlDWnE PERSCm CXlJLD REACH DIFFEP.llr. CXNll.JSIONS AS 'ID \-.~ 
OR lCl' ~ \olERE NEGLIGENI' .AND nrus, THE ISSUE WAS PROPEJ.U..Y 
StJBMlTlll) TO l1iE JURY .AND n£RE WAS .AN EVIDENTI.ARY BASIS FOR niE 
JURY'S VERDicr niAl' ~'IDI\NI'S \olERE tur ~'EGLIGENT 
Plaintiff-Respondent does not question the court's instructions on the 
1al in this case. Plaintiff-Respondent argues that the court was in error in 
fai~ to grant (1) a ~ion For a Directed Verdict that Defendants were negligent 
as a matter of law and (2) a Motion For a New Trial or in the Alternative a Judg-
ment Notwithstanding the Verdict. This court has recently stated the law with 
respect to reviewing the trial court's actions in .Andersen v. Bradley, filed January 
22, 1979, as follows: 
'The law in Utah is clear that if reasonable minds 
could have found as the jury did from the evidence 
before it, then this Court cannot say that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying a party's 
uoticn for a new trial on the ground of insufficiency 
of the evidence to support the verdict." 
This Court also stated, in McCloud v. Baum, 569 P2d 1125 (Utah, 1977), as fall~: 
"In reviewing a trial court's rulines pertaining 
to uoticms for a directed verdict or judgment n.o. 
v., this Court reviews the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non-uovif1$! party and to af-
ford him the benefit of all inferences t .. hich the 
evidence fairly suoports. If reasonable nersons 
could reach diFering conclusions on the issue in 
controversy, a jury question exists and the motion 
should be denied." 
"In reviewif1h a trial court's exercise of discre-
tion upon a motion for a n~v trial, this court 
examines the record to determine ,,nether the evi-
dence to sunport the verdict ,,•as co:nplete ly lack-
ing or tVas so s lir,ht and U!lconvincinf' as to tn..'lke 
the verdict plainly U!lrcasonable ;md U!ljust. If 
there be an evidentiarv hasis for the iury's deci-
sion, then the dcni;"Jl of th..: !1C'\·J trii!l nllit be 
affinred." 
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in controversy," i.e. Defendant's negl~ence and tlms, the Court properly daWd 
Plaintiff-Appellants' tbtion For a Directed Verdict and Judpplent Notwf.ths~ 
the Verdict. 
Defendant-Respondents also resoectfully s\bul.t that baaed on the facta 
of this case, there was an "evidentiary basis for the jury' a decision", that 
Defendants were not negligent and tlms, the Court properly denied Plaintiff-
Appellant's Motion For a New Trial. 
The Court instructed the jury that: 
"Burden of proof ueans the burden of persuasion. 
A party who has the burden of proof DI.ISt persuade 
you that his claim is toore probably true than not 
true . . . In this case, the Plaintiffs have the 
burden of persuading you that the Defendant or 
either of them were negligent and that such negli-
gence was a proximate cause of the injuries and the 
extent of damages, if any." (R. 50). 
The Court then instructed with regard to negligence and Defendant's duty, as follows: 
''Negligence is the lack of ordinary care. It is 
the failure of a person to do sarething t:ilat a 
reasonably careful person 'oNOUld do, or the act 
of a person in doi~ sorrethi~ that a reasonahly 
careful person would not do, measured by all the 
circumstances then existing." (R. 48). 
***** 
"It is the duty of the driver of a uotor vehicle 
to use reasonable care under the circunstances in 
driving that vehicle to avoid danger to himself 
and others and to observe and be aware of the 
conditions at the time and place and under the cir-
cumstances then existing. 
In this connection it is necessary to exercise great-
er caution for the protection and safety of a young 
child than for an adult person. One dealing with 
children Im.JSt anticioate the ordinary behavior 
of children. The fact that they usually cannot 
and do not exercise the same der:ree of prudence 
for their awn safety as adults, they often are 
thourhtless and imoulsive, irrposes a duty to exer-
cise a degree of vifilance and caution carrrensurate 
Hith such circunstilllces in dealing with children." 
(R 51). 
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'lbe jury CQUiidered the evidence and determined that Plaintiff-Appellants 
had failed to carry their burden of persuasicn that it uvre probably was true than 
not true that Defmdant-Respcndents were negligent. Thus, on the Special Verdict 
fcmn, the jury answered that Defendant-Respmdents were not negligent. 
It would be s;>eculative to suggest what factors the jury relied upon 
:in reaching their decision that Defendant-Respondents were not negligmt. As 
this court has recently pointed out in Weeks v. Calderwood, filed January 25, 1979: 
"There is no proper means by which we can presune 
to dissect the jury's deliberations and detennine 
just what factors went into the cunposite of the 
verdict." 
As additional s~rt for the correctness of the jury's decision was 
the trial court's refusal to grant Plaintiff-Appellants lliticn For a New Trial or 
Jud@'Jnent Notwithstanding The Verdict. L11 this regard, this Court stated, in Weeks 
v. Caldet'NOO<i, SIJ!'ra: 
"Supplementary to what has just been said, and 
to be considered in c:onilination therewith, it is 
the trial court's primary responsibility and ore-
rogative to judge such an attack upon a jury ver-
dict; and that when he has so considered and passed 
therecn, that adds sane further solidarity to. t..'I-J.e 
verdict and judgp'lent, and increases the reluctance 
of this Court to interfere therewith." 
The only case cited by Plaintiff-Appellants in support of their argu-
ment that based on the facts, reasonable minds would not differ as to Defendants 
nerl~ence, was Butler v. Sports Haven International, 563 P2d 1245 (Utah, 1977). 
However, in that case, the lower court had granted De!:endant' s t-1otion For Smmarv 
Ju~t and the Supreme Court reversed holding that Plaintiff should be given tl:i 
opportunity of presenting his case to a jury. The basis for the court's rulint: 
was stated as follows: 
"If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the ques-
tions of negligence, proxirr:1te cause, or contribu-
tory negligence, such that reasonab 1e minds m.irht 
conclude differently thcrco:~, the d(•LL'">t should be 
resolved in favor o.f gr=~ing the n;lrt\' the privi-
lef~e of attermtin[: to prove his ri,~!-tt to rt'CO\'er 
on a triRl." 
l 
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The Court recognized that there are 1 'hazards inhermt in an open 8W:lDmlng pool 1 
particularly mere small children are about" and thus 1 ruled that "the propo-
sitioo. is sound that reasonable minds may differ as to whether Wlat the Defmdalt 
did or failed to do . . . met the required standards of reasoo.abl.e care under 
all the circuns tances . " 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff-Appellants were "granted the prlvf.leae 
of att~ting to prove their right to recover" to a jury, but the jury fculd that 
Plaintiff-Appellants had failed to persuade them that Defendants were negligent 
under the facts in evidence. A reasonably prudent persoo. ~t always mticl.-
pate what a child may do and thus, cannot always protect children fran the t:bausJtt-
less and i.rrqml.sive acts which children satEtimes do, notwithst.ancling the exercise 
of vigilence and caution by a reasonably prudent person CCl'IIIelSurate with the c:ir-
cunstances. 
It is respectfully submitted that 'lmder the facts of this case, ''reason-
able minds might conclude differently" and thus, the Court properly slilmitted the 
issue of Defendants negligence to the jury and further, that the jury verdict 
that Defendants were not negligent was supported by the evidence. 
Point II 
SINCE TIIE JURY DE'IE!MINED '!HAT DEFENDANI'-RESPONDEliTS "WERE tDI' 
NEGLIGENI', TIIE JURY DID 001' HAVE TO DETER1INE WHETiiER OR 001' 
JESS KlLPAOC WAS NEGLIGENT NOR DID TIIE JURY MAKE N:N SUCH DETER-
MINATION AND IF JURY VERDICI' HAS INSUF'FICIENI', PIAINTIFF-APPEllliNI'S 
WAIVED 'TI1E lR Rlc:HTS TO OBJECI' TiiERETO 
On the Special Verdict form, the jury answered question No. 1 as follows: 
"(l) Were the Defendants, Wignall, or either of 
them neglir.ent at the time of. the occurrence in 
question? 
Answer: No 
(Yes or No) 
The j urv v1as not required to answer question No. 2 concerning proximate 
c·:,~be because it stated: 
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"(2) If your answer to question No. 1 is ~. 
then answer the following question:" ~nasls 
aaaid). 
The third and fourth questions were the same as the first and second 
questions, except they related to Jess Kilpack. The jury did not answer either 
of these questiCI'IS. It is submitted that the reason they didn 1 t answer the third 
and fourth questiCI'IS was because they didn 1 t feel it was necessary. The jury did 
not answer the fifth question concerning the percentage apportioment of fault 
between the parties either because it provided that: 
"(5) If you have answered all the previous 
questions "yes" then, and ~then are you 
to answer this question:" ( hBSis added). 
nrus, while the answer to question No. 3 concerning whether or not Jess Kilpack 
was negligent may have been interesting, it was not necessary to detennine once 
the jury determined its answer to question No. 1 that Defendant-Res?ondents were 
not negligent. 
Rule 47(r) of the UUL~ Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
"(r) Correction of Verdict. If the verdict 
rendered is infonMl or insufficient, it may 
be corrected by the jury under the advice 
of the Court, or the jury may be sent out 
again." 
The transcript of record, a copy of which is included herein, as Exhibit 
A, reflects the identical facts that existed in Heeks v. Calderwood, supra, where 
this Court stated those facts and ruled as follCMs: 
"At the tim? the verdict was returned, it vJ2S 
read and taken cognizance of by the court ; and 
the jurors ~ere indi\~dually oolled as to their 
agreeP.-en t therewith. The court then thanked 
thc'111 for their se~ce and excused them. l·1ean-
\mLle, Plaintiff's counsel s:1.t silently by and 
made no objectim to the verdict until aftet-
thc jury had left the rourtroCQ. \~e have 
heretofore held that under such cira..rrnstanccs. 
the failure of a o:1rtv to object to a jurv ver-
dict until after the jur: has bc>,•n dismiss<·d, 
thus rEITO\"inl~ the p,>ssiiJil it•: o:' ha\--lCJf the 
jury' sent out' to furthe1- en:.,; ic!er or col-n·ct 
its verdict, armunts tc• i'l •.,·3i•:cr of rir:.r to do 
so. 
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Therefore, it is respectfully subultted that Plaintiff-Appellanta 
waived their rights to have the jury make any determinatim as to whether or not 
Jess Kilpack was or was not negligent. In addition, since the jury had already 
made a detenni.nation that Defendant-Respondents were not negligent, it really 
doesn't matter with respect to the final disposition of this matter whether Jess 
Kiloack was or was not negligent. 
Point III 
TIIERE WAS 00 IRREGlJLA.RITY IN 1HE POOCEEDIH;S OF 1HE JURY 
Plaintiff-Appellants argue that the jury verdict was insufficia'lt ~ 
cause the jury detennined special damages, but IIBde no determination with respect 
to general damages. In this reBard, the answer to question No. 6 in the Special 
Verdict returned by the jury read as follows: 
"(6) Without regard to any of the previous 
questions and your answers thereto, state the 
amount of damage~ sustained by the Plaintiffs 
as a result of the occurrence: 
Special damage sustained 
by Plaintiff, Jerald 
Kiloack · $ 5, 594. 63 
Gen~ral damar,e sustained 
by Plaintiff, Jess Kilpack $ -=====-" (See Special Verdict) 
The Court properly instructed the jury with respect to what special and 
eeneral damages were and Plaintiff-Appellants do not contend otherwise. Plaintiff-
Appellants contend that the jury "disregarded the courts instructions, particularly 
its instruction as to ho;·l to aTJproach the damage question." 
Again, ho;<ever, Plaintiff-Appellant waived their riehts to have the 
jury make a dete=ination as to general darmges. 1-.'eeks v. Calderwood, supra. 
In both Cohn v. J. C. Pennev Comnanv, Inc., 537 P2d 306 (Utah, 1975) and Langton 
':::.. Intema.tional Transnort, Inc. , 491 P2d 1211 (L1tah, 1971) a similar occurrence 
tr>ok place. The respective iuries, in both cases, returned verdicts for the 
exact ;1!110\.lllt of the PL'rintiff's claiJned S;Jccia1 darmges, but for no general damages 
,-,,,,1 in th:·se n:n in:;t rr1C<'S, the verdict forrs did provide spaces for both general 
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and special dallages. Subsequent to the verdicts and the dismissal of the juries, 
cnmsel for both Plaintiffs filed motions for new trials. 
In~. this Court said: 
"'lhe verdict was deficient in fonn, and counsel 
had an opportuli.ty to have the jury sent back for 
further deliberations. This he did not do, 
pe'Ihaps fearing that the jury D'.ight either award 
Ball! naninal aoount or even change the verdict 
and award nothing to the Plaintiff. It l<VOUld 
be a Bllm't trial tactic if he could have had a 
new trial on damages only before a jury, which 
would rot be acquainted with the weakness of 
Plaintiff's cause of action. (At 311-12)." 
In l.angtcn, this Court said: 
"If counsel be permitted to remain nute ~en a 
verdict is insufficient or informal, he gains 
an unfair strategic advantage.*** The silence 
of Plaintiff's counsel, upon hearing the ver-
dict is ca!1'rehensible, he could reasonably 
have concluded that the jury was uns~athetic 
to his cause or parsilronious, and he \oJO\lld, of 
course, prefer a new jury. There nust be reason-
able rules to control the tennination of liti-
gation; if counsel has an opportunity to correct 
error at the t:i.:aE of its occurrence and he fails 
to do so, any objection based thereupon is waived. 
(At 1215)." 
It is respectfully submi. tted that Plaintiff-Appellants cotmSel' s failure 
to object, so as to have the jury sent back for further deliberations on the arro~r.: 
of general damages, wai\>es any irref,Ularity in the verdict. The damage issue has 
been detennined by the jury and Plaintiffs-Appellants failure to tUTely object 
thereto constitutes a waiver and even assuning, arguendo, that this Court was to 
grant a new trial on the issue of liability, no ne\.J trial should be rrantcd v.'ith 
respect to damages. 
Plaintiff-P.ppellants also contend that there Has an "irrep:ularity in,., 
proccedinfS of the jury" in that since the jury "deliberated" for o:1l? "one hcu: 
to one hour and fifteen minutes" <mel such ''c:t>libc·:-:Itions ·.·:ecc durim: th<· "jur:'c 
dered tl1c case and folla,·ed thE' cou:n.'s instn1cticn" 
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First it sOOuld be pointed out that the jury did not go out for bach, 
since their lunch was brought in to them, they reportedly opened their del..ibent:1cal 
with orayer, and they remained in the jury roan fran the time they were sent out, 
which the record does not reflect, alt~ it was scmetime before the DOCI\ hour, 
until they returned with a verdict, which according to the transcript included here-
in as Exhibit A, was "at the hour of 1:35 p.m." Thus, the jury was out for at 
least 1 1/2 hours and possibly up to two hours. 
Second, regarding the length of tiDe a jury deliberates, the ~ 
Supretre Court has held that a jury is not guilty of misCOlduct in a personal in-
jury action merely because it returned a verdict for Defendants after deliberating 
only 40 minutes, where it could not be said that the issues in the case were so 
C'Xlplicated that they could not be decided within 40 minutes. Burback v. Bucher, 
355 P2d 981 at 985 (1960). 
The issues in this case were fairly simple in that the jury had to 
determine whether or not either of the parties were negligent and the lii!ICUlt of 
damages suffered by Plaintiff-Appellants. The Crurt gave only 12 instructicns, 
which though brief, were straight-forward, correct and adequately covered the law 
as it applied to the issues which the jury had to decide. The jurors are entitled 
to a presumption that they conscientiously performed their duties in accordance 
with their oath. As was stated by this Court in Weeks v. Calderwood, supra: 
"The pres1.Jlllltion is that jurors conscientiously per-
form their duties in accordance with their oath and 
have j uclged the case according to the evidence pre-
sented in Court and the law as stated in the instruc-
tions; and this presumption prevails in the absence 
of sorre definite and persuasive proof of misconduct 
from \vhich there would be a substantial likelihood 
of a different result in the trial. Added to this is 
the principle that the deliberations of the jury are 
not ordinarily subject to impeadnent." 
Pldi nti ff-Anpc lLmts have ;Jresented no evidence of any misconduct on the 
oart of the _iury It is not thilt the j ur.' did not ccrnplete the Special Verdict 
for:TJ that conccorns l'l:Jintiff-AfJ:>cllants, it is that the jury did not complete it 
the v.·av Plaintiff-A,"l[>ella,ts think thilt it should have been completed. 
..... 
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1bis Court, in Robinsoo v. Hreinsoo, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P2d 121 (1968), 
made the foll~ appropriate statements concerning jurors: 
"Adjudications upon the fulctioning of a jury 
cannot be based upon the ass~tion that jurors 
are disha'lest or corTUpt. . .. On the contrary 
the success and the tll!rlt of the system, which 
has so ~ stood the test of time, is necessari-
ly g:rc:Dlded upon what we believe to be the sound 
premise: that for the IIDSt part jurors take 
their responsibilities seriously; that they attenpt 
to judge the rights of their fel1CJ!oo1 citizens 
fairly; and to appraise danages honestly." 
Plaintiff-Appellants also contend that there were "inadequate damages 
appearing to have been given under passion or prejudice", but cite nothing that 
was dale in Court to support such a claim other than a dissatisfaction with the 
jury verdict. The jury may not have given the sarre effort to determining damages 
that they would have given had they detennined that Defendant-Respondents were 
negligent, but Plaintiff-Appellants waived whatever rights they had with respect 
thereto by failing to object and request that the jury be sent out again to C001Jlet' 
their verdict. 
Finally, Plaintiff-Appellants simply restate prior arguments made in 
ccntending that there was an "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver-
dict" and "an error at law." Although the oosition of Defendant-Respondents with 
regard to these claims has been previously stated herein, Defendant-Respondents 
would offer these additional observations. Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the 
evidence was insufficient and maintains that the Court erred as a matter of law, 
in sul:rnitting the issue of nee,ligence to the jury, 'because the evidence is so 
clear that reasonable minds could not differ as to the neglipence issues." As-
suminr, the Plaintiff-Appellant and Plaintiff-Appellant's co~el have reasonable 
minds, then obviously rea.son:Jhlc minds do di~'fer beca\.Lse the jill-y :ound the 
Defendant-Resoondents not to be nep,li[·cnt. 
In addrcssinf. the issue of t:,rcmt in;· nC'.I trials, the l'tc~1 1 SI.IDnwe C0t" ·. 
T 
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has set forth the general rule, in Brunson v. Strong, 412 P2d 451 (Utah, 1966), 
that: 
·~en both sides have been given an opportm:ity 
to present their evidence and ca1tention.'i to a 
jury, and a verdict has been rendered, all pre-
s~tions support its validity. Consequently, 
it nust stand unless the Appellant shows that 
error was camti.tted which had such an adverse 
effect uoon the trial that there is a reasmable 
likelihoOd that the result would have been 
different in its absence." 
***** 
''We do not question the sincerity of Plaintiff's 
belief that the award of only $1,000.00 is inade-
quate CCJ!Q)ensation for the injury she cl.aiD& to have 
suffered to her back. But it is sa~ething about 
which there is roan for difference of opinion.*** 
Due to its acknowledge prerogatives, its advantaged 
position, and the desireability of safeguarding 
the integrity of the jury system, the Courts are 
and should be reluctant to interfere with a jury 
verdict and will not do so as long as there is any 
reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it." 
In the case at bar, certainly no error "was camti.tted which had such an adverse 
effect upon the trial that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would 
have been different in its absence." 
Plaintiff-Appellant further argues that the Court made "an error in 
the law'' because it did not grant Plaintiff-Appellants' M:>tion For a Directed 
Verdict or Judg}l'el1t Notwithstanding The Verdict. Plaintiff-Appellants, of course, 
maintain that the evidence is so overwhelming that t.~e issue of the Defendant-
Respondents' negligence should not have been submitted to the jury. In essence, 
Plaintiff-Annellants are stati!lE: There was an accident an:i therefore, the 
Defendant-Respondents were ne~ligent. Plaintiff-Appellant's Whole argument assumes 
that because a child was injured, someone other than the child must be responsible 
for that injury. If such Has the l;m, then, of course, there 1vould be no reason 
tc• suhrn t any child !'l'rsmal injury liability issues to a jury. But such is not 
t.h'-' L-r:. 11w issue being decided '.lClS not \·.nether a child had been injured, but 
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llhether the Defendant-Respondents exercised reasonable care under the cirClmStan-
ces. Defendmt-Respcndents are not to be judged on the basis of hindsight. 
In this regard, the jury was properly instructed as to the duties and 
responsibilities of the parties in the instructions. The jury then applied these 
instructicas to the facts of this case and found that Defendant-Respondents did 
not breach Brrf of their duties and responsibilities. Since the question of 
llhether or not Defendant-Respcndents were neglieent is me upon which reasonable 
minds can differ, it was properly submitted to the jury. 
Plaintiff-Appellants repeatedly SPeculate throughout their Brief as 
to the reasons why the jury decided that Defendant-Respondents were not negligent. 
All such soeculatim is couched in terms of alleged jury misconduct. Plaintiff-
Appellants fail to recOf}"li.ze that the jury, after considering all the evidence 
and the Court's instructions, may have decided that Plaintiff-Appellants s:i.Iq>ly 
failed to carry their burden of persuasion that Defendant-Respondents were 
negligent, or the jury may have decided that Plaintiff-Appellant's accident 
was me that just happened without anyone' s negligence . While the Court did not 
so instruct the jury, the law is clear that: 
"The mere fact that an accident hapnened, con-
sidered alone, does not support an inference 
that (Defendant-Respondents) or any party, to 
this action was neglifent." (J. I. F. U. 16. 6) 
The facts of this case are sorrewhat similar to a recent episode of the 
television shON ''Little House On The Prairie." Charles Engles' daughter, Lora, 
who is portrayed as 12 or 13, had a friend visitii1f, tile farm. The friend wanted 
to go swinminr. and Lora agreed to take the friend to t'l-te family's favorite swiln-
ming hole. I.Jhile s;.rurrning, the friend either slin:-ed on a rod: or sCJ!T'ething, hit 
her head, and drc,;•ned. The friend's nDthcr blilf'led Lora for the death of her 
daughter. Lora, of course, '-'dS heartbro~en Ch:lr1es Enclcs, her father, "·ent ir:: 
his daughter's rocm and in .:m attcc:?t to sootJ'c hc·c- slut tcn·d fee 1 infs, pul hLs 
around her, and sharc>d. •-rith ~1cr this bit of • .. ~s,1 •" 
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"'Folks can't fortell the future. Sa!etina 
thi.rlfs just happen. There's no ooe to blaDe 
for it."' 
In other words, sane accidents are caused by saneone's negligellce, ~ • .a. 
other accidents just happen and there's no me to blaDe far it, 
In order for the Court to have granted Plaintiff-Appellant's lobt::lon Far 
a Directed Verdict or Judgllent Notwi.thstmding the Verdict, the Plaintiff-Appel.lart: 
had the burden of proving, as a matter of law, that the Defendant-Respondenta did 
not exercise reasonable care, which, in essence, ueans that Plaintiff-Appellant 
nust prove that based on the evidence, viewed in the light mst favorable to 
Defendant-Resoondents, that reasonable nd.nds could not differ that Defendant-
Respondents were negligent. Plaintiff-Appellant failed to establish, as a Etter 
of law, that the Defendant-Respondents did not exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances and thus, the lower Court denied its t-t>tion For a Directed Verdict 
and Plaintiff-Appellant's M:>tion For a J~nt Notwithstanding the Verdict, which 
denials are supported by the jury's finding that Defendant-Respondents were not 
neglir.ent. 
Point IV and Point V 
'WHETIJER OR 001' TiiE 01UPT ER.RED rn r.!W.n'ING DEFE:ID\!n'' S MJI'IOH 
FOR A HISTRIAL AND IN DISQ-IA.~Il\G TiiE FIRSl' JURY IS IR~Alfl' 
AND ll11ATERIAL TO TilE SECCXID TRIAL QF TillS CASE 
It is reS!Jectfully subT!li.tted that what the Court did or did not do in 
the first trial is not relevant or material to this case. Notwithstanding 'What 
happened on the first trial, the Plaintiff-Arpellants were given a full oopor-
tunity in the second trial of this case to fully present thejr case to the jury. 
Plaintiff-Appellants ar~;Ue that the Court erred in grantinr Defendant-
Respondents' ~btion For a Mistrial because of Plaintiff-Appellants obvious attempt 
to inject the issue of "insurance" into the trial. Two Utah Supreme Court cases, 
c:._ __ R~··~ens Truckin_L Corporation v. StC' .. '<>rt, 29 Utah 2d 353, 509 P2d 821 (1973) 
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does not, in all cases, lead to the conclusion that a jury was !'Jrejudiced, or 
likely to be such an extent that a fair trial could not be had," and affinred 
the lower court's denial of a tbtion For a Mistrial. However, 'in another Utah 
Supreae Court case, lvie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d.S, 336 P2d 781 (1959) the Supz-em? 
Court reversed a lower court because of the injection of insurance (although this 
was just one of many circurstances preventing a fair trial) by reason of Plain-
tiff's l.alyer's repeated attmpts to identify a man as an insurance agent~ had 
taken a statel!Ent fran his client. 
All three of these Utah Suprene Court cases. however, involved autaro-
bile accidents, mlike the case at bar, \ohich involves a farm accident. While 
the answer to the question of whether or not the inadvertent injection of in-
surance into an autaoobile accident case is so prejudicial as to warrant a new 
trial may be questionable in lig)1t of the above referred to decisions, it is 
respectfully submitted that the deliberate injection of insurance into a non-
automobile accident case is a different matter and under the circumstances of 
the case at bar, the l(J';Ner court properly granted Defendant-Respondents' Motion 
For a Mistrial. Whether or not Defendant-Respondents had insurance in this 
case at bar is imnaterial and Plaintiff-Appellants should not have been allCfo'ed 
to ask the jury questions that create an inference that Defendant-Respondents did 
ha~ insurance. 
Notwithstandi.n9, \·lhat wa..c; done, hCJ\.,rever in the first trial, Plaintiff-
Ar>pellants were provided a full and fair onportunity to present their case in a 
subsequent trial and ,.,ri th rcsoect thereto, the sar;.e c;m he said as uas concluded 
bv the Court in P.ohinson v. Hreinson, s t.nra, as follO\,'S: 
"The parties h,wc haJ \o.'\1at they '"ere cntitlPd to· a 
full and fair onportunitv to :Jrese:1t their cont<>ntions 
and tlw ev'idcr.ce S1J?port in!' thcrn to the Court and 
jurv. \,'hen this has been done all ores\.lrWtions ar(O in 
f<J,:or of the v<Jlidity of thP verdict and jucit'TTicnc." 
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OONCLUSION 
It is resoectfully submitted that reasonable persons could reach differ-
ent conclusicns as to 'Whether or not Defendant-Respondents were negligent &1d tbJa, 
the issue was properly sul:mitted to the jury and there was an evidentiary basia 
for the jury's verdict that the Defendant-Respcndents were not negligent &1d pur-
suant thereto, this Court should affinn the Judp,Dent entered pursuant to the 
jury verdict in favor of the Defendant-Respcndents and against Plaintiff-Appellmta, 
no cause of action. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 1979. 
f-{)RC,A.U, SOOLEY & DA.VIS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the fore-
going Brief of Tiespondents to David S. Cook, Esquire, Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellants, 85 West 400 North, Bcnmtiful, Utah, 84010, postage prepaid, this 23rd 
day of APril, 1979. 
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1 (Kilpack v. Wiqnall) October 4, 1978 
2 
3 
at the hour of lol5 p.a. 
4 THE COUR'l': La4i .. and Gentl-D 
l5 of the Jury, have you arrived at a verdict? 
JO'RY FOREMAN: Ye•. 









The Clerk will read the verdict. 
THE C!.ERK: We the jury find 
12 the followinq answers to questions submitted to u• by 
l3 the court: (l) Were the defendants Wiqnall or either 
14 of them neqliqent at the time of the occurrence in que•tion? 
:5 Answer: llo. (2). 
16 THE COURT: Now they haven't anavered 
l7 2, 3, 4, 5, And 6, read it. 
18 THE CLERK: Number 6: Without 
:9 regard to any of the previous questions and your anawera 
:"J thereto s~ate the amount of dar.taqes sustair.ed by the 
21 plaintif~s as a result of ~he occurrence: Spec1al damaqe 
22 susta1ned by pla1nt1ff Jerald Ki:pack: $5,594.63. 
23 Ger.eral Carnages sustained Cy plaintlff Jess Kll?ack ncne. 
24 0" ted--
THE CCVRT: It doesn't say ~none•. 
2S It's blac.k. 
27 THE C:ERK: I can't read the 
Z3 ~oreman's narre. 
23 n•RY ?ORE~.AN: Gary Stone. 
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1 polled, Mr. cool<? 
2 
3 
MR. COOK: Yes, I would appreciate it. 
THE CLERK: Ladies and Gentlemen, 
4 would you pleaae anawer yes or not to this quest1on: 











JUROR KEMPTON: That was my verdict. 
THE CLERK: Louise Jensen? 
JUROR JENSEN: That was my verd1ct. 
THE CLERK: Donna Points? 
JUROR POINTS: Yes. 
THE CLERK: Rex Taylor? 
JUROR TAYLOR: Yes. 
THE CLERK: Glade Schwartz? 
JUROR SCHWARTZ: Yes. 
THE CLERK: Juanita Mellor? 
JUROR MELLOR: Yes. 
THE CLERK: Gary Stor.e? 
JUROR STO~=:: Yes. 
THE CLERK: And C~arlyn B1rrell? 
JUROR BIR.'U:LL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Lad~es ar.c Gentlemen, 
:: for your ~n:o~t~on the law protects 3bsolutely and 
23 cor."~pl.etely the Cel.:..beratl.or.s of the JUI""f. You are even 
24 prec:uded fr~m test.:..fy~ng about w~at transp1reC 1n the 
~.5 Jury roo~. Sor.-et.:..:r.es t:~e ?ar::1es or at::~rnyes :Jr 
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THE CIZU:: Juat on call. 
THE COURT: On behalf of eYe&yOM 
3 concerned I thank you tor your aervicea here today, and 
4 you are on call. You are excuae4 now. 
5 (Whereupon, the jury left the courtroo.. l 
6 I auppoae under the atatuta all I need do DOW ia 
7 direct the clerk to enter a verdict of no cauae of actioD, 
a is that correct? 
9 





17 the jury, Your Honor. 
18 
:9 before the court? 
MR. COOK: I auppoae we will be 
THE COURT: You have ten daya to do 
MR. COOK: Correct. 
THE COURT: Do you want to arque it 
MR. cooK: I have made rtl"f argument before 
T3E CCL~T: Any other mat~era to com. 
We will be in recess. 
(Court was ordered in recess.) 
23 
-- ----------- 4. 
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l REPORTER'S CE:RTIFICAT!: 
2 I, Stanley C. Roundy, certi!y that I am an official 
3 court reporter i~ the Fourth JUdicial D>strict court of 
4 the State of Utah; that I wu present during the proceedings 
5 in the caae of Kilpack vs. Wignall; that thereat 
6 reported the proceeding a in shorthand: that thereafter 
7 cauaed a portion of my note• thus taken to be transcribed 
e into typ-rit>ng; that said transcript u set forth in 
9 the foregoing pages numbered ~rom l to 4, inclusive; that 
10 said part~al transcript is a true record of that port1on 






Dated November 7, 1978. 
~ 
----;:-:;;'L'7~:-;~.'-':~-:-:· :::c/::--:;-::-::=~::---CSR 
Offict3t court Reporter 
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-27- EXHIBIT "B" 
1 CROSS-EXAMINATI~~ 
2 BY Mil.. MORGAN: 
3 Q Mrs. Killpack, u I undaratal:ld it you ball 
4 visited the Wignall farm on nu~~~&rous oeeasioaa before the 
5 accident? 
6 A Not this particular faraa, but I bad be• dcMc 
7 there n\JIIIerous times. 
8 Q How many times have you visited this partlculu 





Probably around three. 
And on those oc:eas ions would you taka your 
Someti.cles I would take part of them. s-uau 
14 I would take all of them. 
15 Q On one occasion you and your husband apparently 







So you were familiar with what that operation 
Yes. 
At that particular time did Mark and his boys 




At the time we went out? 
Yes. 
No, we just went out, but we didn't unload it. 





Did you go out and get one load? 
we just we~t out and got one load and broughL it 
was that kind of to help them out? 
Ellna Killpack-C 
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1 A Yea and it was fun. 
2 Q Nov would you agree that a farm per se has 
3 many places on it wherein children could get in trouble? 




More so than maybe at your home? 
Yes. 








to your children prior to the time you went down to the 
Wignall farm as to what they should do to be eareful? 
A I don't think so. 
Q Now once you got down to the farm there came a 
time apparently when you and your two sisters wera going to 
leave and take your three younger children and leave yoiU" 




Now when you decided to leave apparently you 
17 left the three or the two younger children in the care of 




And in terms of leaving the children in the 
21 ca:::e of Oelynn what did you say to Delynn, other than 







30 of the head. 
"Watch the kids." 
That's it? 
(Witness nodded head in the affi~~tive.) 
THE COURT: Answer audibly so he can 
''~atch the kids". 
THE C00RT: He doesn't record sr.ake> 
Ellna Killp~c~-C 
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could hear you giving that iQstructiou to Delynmt 
A No. 
Q So they wouldn't have lalowl wbatba:r: 11111 -e 
leaving or iu whose care they had beau left, voW.4 tbly! 
A They usU&lly lmow a ahte:r: 1a ~cb!Da tMa. 
7 Q 
8 A 
If yo~'re not there? 
Yes. 
9 Q They wouldn't have lmowu tbU 'by raaa• of )'DU 










of which you are aware? 
A Well on previous occasions. Ou this pa:r:tlcW.a:r: 
time I didn't. 
Q Did you feel comfortable ·1u luviDa t'boae two 
children, a seven year old and a Dine year old, •1D the care 
of your fourteen year old daughter on the farm? 
A Yes. 
Q And had your fourteen year 'old daughter beau t.o 




She had a frfend there I believe, a sixteau 
22 year old Wignall girl? 
23 A Uh-huh. 
24 Q And were they involved in doing some tb1Dgs 
25 together at the time you left? 
26 A They weren't in any activities, but just vlsitin , 




Visiting in the house? 
Yes. 
So you left givin6 instruction to Del~ that 
Ellna Killpack-C 
,  
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1 you're laavinc, •Watch the kids"? 













(Witness nodded head.) 
That is correct, isn't it? 
Yes. 
lliE COURT: You have to speak up. 
(By Mr. Morgan) And you had never instructed 
10 your children what not to do down on the farm, correct? 
U A Well, I had given them instructions here and 
12 there about safety all the time, but not that I recall on 
13 this particular tice. 
14 Q You k."lew that Mark and David and his boys had 





Were you aware that Danny had gone out on prior 
19 occasiotu with :-<.ark and David? 
20 A No. 
21 Q Was D~nny a friend of Joel and Jess? 
22 A Danny and Joel are one month apart in their 
23 age. 
24 Q No•,.; you have testified relative to observatior..s 
25 you have QaCe conce~i~g Jess and what he could do before 
26 the accident ve:-sus ·•hat he could do since the accident, 







:-.e:.,·e ~llru Kill~2.ck.' s deposition 
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THE COimT: You .ay. 
(Whereupon, the depoa1t1oll vu pubUshe4.) 
(Continuln& by Hr. Morau) Do 10'1 nca11 :r-





I call your attant1oll to the nd of the 




Does that appear below a stat.-.nc that yeN 'llan 
11 read the foregoing deposition and that you know the caat.mts 
12 thereof and that the same are true of your owa kzlowladae, _ 




Could I get you to tura to paae 14_of your 
16 deposition, parti~ularly line 21. This vas a quastian 
17 asked on January 8, 1977 by me. 
18 Question: "As far as gettiDg along right. DOW with 
19 the normal affairs of life, physic.ally speaking, bow is he 
20 doing?" 
21 What was your enswer? 
22 Answer: "He does fine. He looks a little ~rooked, 
23 but he is really coing fiDe." 
24 Question: "Looks crooked? In what way does he look 
25 crooked?" 
26 Read your answer. 
27 Answer: "His body looks a little crooked. It looks· 
28 like one leg is -- he is a little twisted right in the 
29 buttocks area." 
30L_ ______ ~Qu~e-st_~_·o_n_: ___ "_P_hv~--s~ic_a~l~l;y,,~wh~a~t~e=ls~e--ha __ v_e~y-ou __ n_o_t_i_c_e_d __ .-J 
T[Tna !Ul:lpad:.-C 
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1 about him in terms of what he can or can't do now?" 
2 
a 
Answer: •He can do pretty near everything.• 
Question: "He mentions he doesn't run as fast. 
4 Do you have a comment in that regard?" 
D 
6 
Answer: •Yell, he doesn't, but he does run. I am 
arataful that he even runs. He is more of a nervoU3 type 
7 child thaD he ever was before. Any little thing -- he just 
8 screams in a high pitched tone and all the other kids compla 
9 that ha is spoiled. He doesn't have any patience for takinc 
10 anything." 
11 Question: ·~~t differences have you noticed about 
12 Jess after the accident that are different than what he was 
1:5 like before the accident?" 





That was your testL~ony on that occasion1 
Uh-huh. 
Was it true? 
Yes, but I still think we need to "atch him; 
19 and he still continues to r~ve problems. 
20 HR. HORGA.'I:· That's all. 
2l 
22 wi~h this witness? 
23 






BY l-S. CGOK: 
THE COURT: 1-'..::-. Cook, anything further 
NR. COCK: Just a couple of questions, 
30L__A ____________ ,_·_e_s_. ____ ~~~~~~~~~------------------
~ll:-. .J. Kil~::;2:~:-KD 
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